Media Literacy
Interactive Learning Module
Three terms that are not synonyms. Four mechanisms that move false content across the world. One case study that shows how they work together.
Part 01
These three terms are used interchangeably in everyday conversation. They shouldn't be. The distinction matters because each requires a different response — and because understanding the difference is the first step to not being fooled by any of them.
Each example below is revealed one at a time. Discuss before the label is shown.
Example 1 of 5
WhatsApp · Scarborough parent group, September 2021
"Just sharing this in case — saw it from another parent. Apparently the new [Brand] hand sanitiser has caused blindness in three children in Ontario. Please check what your kids are using at school. Better safe than sorry."
The claim originated from a 2015 article about a different product, misread and stripped of its original context. The parent forwarding it has no idea. She is acting out of concern for other families.
The parent genuinely believes she is doing something helpful. There is no intent to deceive. This is a problem of negligence — she has not verified the claim before amplifying it to hundreds of people. Critically: her good intentions do not change the harm of spreading a false claim. Misinformation is defined by the absence of deceptive intent, not the absence of consequence.
Example 2 of 5
Twitter/X · Network of coordinated accounts, federal election period
"BREAKING: Multiple sources confirm [Candidate Name] has a sealed criminal record for fraud. This is being suppressed. Share before it's taken down. #cdnpoli"
The claim is entirely fabricated. An investigation later traced the accounts to a network of coordinated bots posting the identical claim simultaneously from servers outside Canada. The candidate has no criminal record of any kind.
The defining feature here is intent. This was manufactured and deployed — not a mistake, not a rumour someone half-remembered. The coordinated simultaneous posting, the identical language across accounts, the instruction to share before removal: these are signatures of organised disinformation. No one running these accounts believed what they were posting.
Example 3 of 5
Provincial government · Pre-budget radio ad
"Under our leadership, hospital wait times are down 12%. New schools are being built across the province. Forty thousand new jobs have been created. Our plan is working for you."
Every single statistic is accurate and independently verified. What the ad does not mention: these gains followed four consecutive years of cuts that produced record-high wait times; and provincial job growth has trailed the national average in each of those years.
Zero false facts. One hundred percent curated reality. This is propaganda's most instructive form — it doesn't need to lie. It only needs to select. The government chose which truths to tell and which to omit, producing a picture that is technically accurate and substantively misleading. No individual claim can be "debunked" because no individual claim is false. That is precisely what makes it effective.
Example 4 of 5
Facebook · Community group, City of Hamilton
"SHARE THIS: [Councillor Name] said at last night's meeting that she supports cutting winter road maintenance by 40%. Our streets will be UNPLOWED. This is not okay."
The quote is completely fabricated. A political organiser created and posted it after a contentious council vote on an unrelated matter. Within 48 hours the post had 3,400 shares. Most people sharing it had never questioned its source or searched for any coverage of the supposed meeting.
The origin is disinformation: a deliberate fabrication with clear intent to mislead. But what is now spreading through 3,400 shares is misinformation: thousands of people forwarding something false because they believe it. The same piece of content has become both simultaneously. The people sharing it are not liars — they are the deceived. This is how disinformation seeds misinformation: it manufactures a false claim and then releases it into networks of good-faith sharers.
Example 5 of 5
State broadcaster · Prime-time news segment, disputed election period
Nightly news segment, six weeks before a national vote, reports that the main opposition party received illegal campaign funding from a foreign government. The report is carefully produced, cites named officials, and runs for five minutes. Independent investigators later find the story was entirely fabricated.
The broadcaster is state-controlled. The government using it is facing a serious electoral challenge. The fabricated story runs for six consecutive weeks. The independent investigation confirming it was false publishes three weeks after the election.
It is disinformation: deliberately false, with clear intent to mislead voters. But it is also propaganda: produced by a state institution, serving an explicit political agenda, using every tool of legitimate journalism — sourcing, production value, measured tone — to accomplish a political goal. Disinformation and propaganda are not mutually exclusive. When a state apparatus manufactures false content to shape a political outcome, both terms apply.
Part 02
None of these four mechanisms require anyone to be malicious. Most misinformation is moved by ordinary people who believe what they are sharing. Understanding the system — not just the content — is what makes the difference.
Mechanism 01
Platforms do not optimise for accuracy. They optimise for engagement. Outrage, fear, and disgust generate more engagement than measured analysis.
The algorithm has no interest in whether a story is true. It tracks what makes you stay, click, and share, then shows you more of that. Anxiety-confirming content in a parenting group generates clicks, shares, and comments, all of which signal to the algorithm that this post should reach more people. The system rewards emotional resonance over factual accuracy.
Over time, this creates echo chambers: progressively narrowed information landscapes where the content you see confirms what you already believe, not because anyone planned it that way, but because that is what gets clicked.
The algorithm is not trying to radicalise anyone. It is trying to keep people scrolling. Radicalisation, when it occurs, is a side effect of optimising for engagement. The system is indifferent to the content; it cares only about the behaviour.
Facebook algorithm · Parenting group, 2018–19
A parent in a school Facebook group clicks on a warning post about online dangers targeting children. Within 24 hours, her feed contains eleven more posts on the same topic, from different groups, different accounts, none of which she sought out. Each post is more alarming than the last.
The algorithm has identified child safety content as high-engagement for this user. It serves more. The parent did not choose to seek out alarming content; the platform chose it for her.
Quick Check
In the example above, the parent did not search for more alarming content. She was served it. This is primarily a problem of:
Mechanism 02
We are all more likely to believe and share information that confirms what we already think. This is not a weakness unique to people we disagree with.
When a claim arrives that fits our existing model of the world, it feels credible — not because we have examined its evidence, but because it is familiar. We have, in some sense, already believed it. The verification step that critical thinking requires is skipped because the conclusion already feels right.
The uncomfortable version of this: if you only notice bias in sources you already distrust, that is confirmation bias at work. It is not a failure of intelligence. It is a feature of how all human cognition processes information under conditions of uncertainty and overload.
WhatsApp · Parent group, Greater Toronto Area, 2022
A parent who has spent several months reading about food additives and children's health receives a forwarded message claiming a popular brand of children's snacks contains a chemical linked to developmental delays. She reads the first sentence. She does not search for the source. She forwards it to 53 contacts within two minutes.
She does not forward it because she has verified it. She forwards it because it fits a picture of the world she has been building for months. The anxiety was already there. The message simply confirmed it.
Quick Check
Confirmation bias requires prior familiarity with the specific claim. Because the parent in the example had never seen this warning before, this cannot be an example of confirmation bias at work.
Mechanism 03
Repetition makes claims feel true, regardless of their actual truth value. This is a documented cognitive phenomenon, not an opinion.
The more times we encounter a claim — even in the context of debunking it — the more familiar it becomes. Familiarity gets mistaken for credibility. The brain registers "I have heard this before" as weak evidence that the claim has survived scrutiny. It hasn't. It has simply been repeated.
This is why "don't repeat the lie when you debunk it" is standard advice in communications strategy. Repeating a false claim, even to say it is false, can strengthen the claim's perceived credibility. The headline "Does Sugar Really Make Kids Hyper?" contains the claim — and that is all the repetition effect needs.
Popular science and parenting publications · Recurring, 1994–present
The claim that sugar makes children hyperactive has been tested in controlled trials and disproved since 1994. Science and parenting outlets continue to publish articles titled "Does Sugar Really Make Kids Hyper?" and "The Sugar Myth: Separating Fact from Fiction." Each new debunking names the claim in its headline.
Surveys of parenting beliefs show the sugar-hyperactivity link remains widely accepted decades after it was disproved. The myth's persistence is, in part, a product of its repeated correction. Every new debunking article introduces the claim to readers who had never encountered it.
Quick Check
A district health unit sends a letter to schools: "We have received reports of a social media challenge encouraging dangerous behaviour among teenagers. We have not confirmed any local cases, but encourage parents to speak with their children about online safety." The letter:
Mechanism 04
Sharing requires almost no effort or thought. There is no pause that asks: have you read this? Is this accurate? What are you amplifying? The design is optimised for volume, not verification.
An Instagram repost takes one tap. A Snapchat forward takes two. The absence of friction is not an accident; it is a product decision. The platforms that move the most content are the ones that have most aggressively removed the steps between receiving a claim and passing it on. Verification would require effort. Effort reduces volume. Reduced volume reduces revenue.
The design does not cause misinformation. But it creates conditions in which the default behaviour, the path of least resistance, is sharing without checking.
Instagram DMs and Snapchat · Secondary school networks, 2023
A screenshot of an unverified claim about a local incident circulates through private Instagram DMs and Snapchat messages across several secondary schools. Within 24 hours it reaches students in multiple cities. There is no comment thread, no visible share count, no public fact-check label. Each person who received it received it from someone they personally know.
The private context of direct messaging adds personal trust to the content. Unlike a public post with visible reactions, a DM arrives as if personally chosen for you, by someone you trust. The same design feature that makes messaging feel intimate also removes the social friction that might slow a share.
Association
Match each platform design feature to the friction it removes.
Case Study
Between 2018 and 2019, a story about a fictional online threat to children spread to 26 countries, prompted official warnings from police forces, charities, and schools, and caused documented distress to children frightened by the warnings themselves. The story was, in the main, a hoax. This is what happened, and how.
The "Momo" character was a sculpture called Mother Bird, created by Japanese artist Keisuke Aisawa of the special effects company Link Factory. It was exhibited at a Tokyo gallery in 2016. The artist destroyed the original piece in 2018. He has expressed distress at how his work was used.
Each stage is revealed in sequence. Advance when ready.
Stage 01 · 2016–2018
WhatsApp · International circulation, 2018
A disturbing figure, a pale wide-eyed creature with a bird's body, begins appearing in WhatsApp groups, primarily in Latin America and then spreading internationally. The story attached to the image: a character called "Momo" was contacting children directly through the app, sending disturbing content, and issuing challenges including instructions to harm themselves or others. Screenshots of alleged Momo conversations circulate. No one photographs the same conversation twice.
Before we go further: at this stage, is the original claim misinformation, disinformation, or propaganda? What would you need to know to be sure?
Reveal answer ↓Stage 02 · Late 2018
Facebook parenting groups · UK, US, Canada, 2018
The Momo warning spreads through parenting communities on WhatsApp and Facebook. Groups connected to schools, neighbourhood associations, and sports clubs begin forwarding alerts. Parents share with every contact in their networks. The people forwarding the warning are not attempting to deceive anyone. They believe it, and they are acting out of care for their children.
No verified case of Momo contacting a child is reported anywhere during this period. No child or parent can produce an unedited screenshot showing an actual Momo contact. This information is not sought. The claim is shared as received.
Which of the four mechanisms from Part 02 (Algorithms & Echo Chambers, Confirmation Bias, The Illusory Truth Effect, Lack of Friction) are most visible at this stage? Can you see more than one operating simultaneously?
Reveal answer ↓Stage 03 · Early 2019
West Midlands Police press release · February 2019 / NSPCC statement · 2019
Schools begin receiving so many enquiries from concerned parents that they issue letters home. West Midlands Police publishes a press release acknowledging the concern and advising parents to speak to children about online safety. The NSPCC responds to media enquiries. Local police forces across Canada and the US follow.
Critically: none of these institutions are responding to verified cases. They are responding to the volume of parental anxiety. Their statements uniformly note that claims are unverified. But the mere fact of their involvement, a police force, a national children's charity, a school, is structurally indistinguishable from confirmation.
What is the difference between "we have received concerns about this" and "we have verified this is happening"? In practice, for a parent reading a school letter, does that difference register?
Reveal answer ↓Stage 04 · February 2019
BBC News, The Guardian, CBC, CTV, multiple outlets · February 2019
Major news organisations publish investigations. Headlines ask: "Is the Momo Challenge Real?" "What Is the Momo Challenge?" "The Momo Challenge: Separating Fact from Fiction." The framing is investigative. Journalists are attempting to interrogate the story, not amplify it.
The Momo Challenge trends in search engines within 48 hours of the BBC's coverage. Parents who had not previously heard of it now search for it in large numbers, primarily because a credible institution has asked, in a headline, whether it is real. The question contains the name. The name is now searchable. The illusory truth effect does not care about the framing.
Is there a responsible way for a news organisation to cover a story like this? If you ask "is it real?" publicly, have you already made the answer matter less?
Reveal answer ↓Stage 05 · 2019
YouTube, Facebook statements · 2019 / Snopes rating: Unproven / AFP Fact Check · 2019
YouTube states it has found no videos on its platform containing Momo Challenge content targeting children. Facebook says the same. The NSPCC finds no verified cases in the UK of a child being harmed by the challenge. AFP and Snopes both investigate and rate the viral claims as unproven. Journalists report on the hoax angle more directly.
The story fades, not because it is definitively killed, but because news cycles move on. No formal retraction or correction is issued by most of the outlets that covered it. The school letters are not recalled. The police press releases remain online.
Documented consequence: child psychologists in the UK and Canada report a significant number of children presenting with anxiety specifically about the Momo character, anxiety produced not by encountering the character itself, but by hearing the warnings.
The harm, in many documented cases, came from the warning, not the thing being warned about. What does this tell us about how corrections and amplifications travel differently through the same networks?
Reveal answer ↓The Asymmetry
The Story Spread
countries where the story trended
The Correction
formal retractions issued by most outlets
"The correction existed. It was published by a reputable source. It reached far fewer people than the original claim. This is not a failure of fact-checking; it is a structural feature of the same system that spread the story. Corrections are less emotionally engaging. The algorithm does not reward them."
End of case study
The Momo Challenge was not an extreme example. It did not involve a state actor, a foreign intelligence operation, or a deliberately orchestrated attack on democratic institutions. It was a misread piece of art, a few people with time on their hands, and a network of parents who cared about their children. And it still reached 26 countries, prompted official police warnings on four continents, and produced documented psychological harm caused not by the thing being warned about, but by the warnings themselves.
That is why this case matters. It shows what these systems do under ordinary conditions, without extraordinary malice.
Part 01
Misinformation
The thousands of parents who forwarded the warning. No intent to deceive. Acting out of care. The negligence was collective, not individual.
Part 01
Disinformation
The original creation of the false story. If deliberate, which remains unverified, it was disinformation at origin that seeded a much larger field of misinformation.
Part 01
Propaganda
School letters and police press releases were not false. But they selected and amplified one narrative, the danger, without verification, under credible institutional letterhead. Structurally they functioned as propaganda in the technical sense: framing and selection producing a misleading picture without a single false statement.
Mechanism 01
Algorithms & Echo Chambers
High-engagement warning content was served to more users with no editorial check. Each click trained the algorithm to show more.
Mechanism 02
Confirmation Bias
Pre-existing parental anxiety about online dangers made the claim immediately plausible. No evidence was required.
Mechanism 03
The Illusory Truth Effect
Each repetition, a school letter, a BBC headline, a police release, added perceived credibility regardless of whether the claim had been confirmed.
Mechanism 04
Lack of Friction
A forward takes seconds. It leaves no public record, carries no fact-check label, and arrives from someone you know personally.